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Response
Liberal Constitutionalism and Liberal Justice
Cass R. Sunstein*
The Framers of the American Constitution hoped to create a deliberative democracy. They also believed in a modest role for the judiciary.
Both the hope and the belief were deepened during the Civil War and New
Deal periods. If modem constitutional interpreters were guided by the
same basic idea of deliberative democracy-with its apparently limited role

for the judiciary-what would happen to our constitutional rights as we
now know them?
It seems clear that a well-functioning deliberative democracy would include a large set of rights, including, above all, rights of political participation and political (not economic) equality.' Nonetheless, a system of deliberative democracy might well fall short of what would be required in a

fully just society. Broad rights of privacy would not necessarily flourish
in such a system. So, too, a system of deliberative democracy might slight

at least some rights of conscience, including the right to speak freely when
politics is not involved. It therefore seems reasonable to ask whether we

might not be quite wrong to root our theory of constitutionalism or constitutional interpretation in a theory of democracy, whether deliberative or
otherwise. Would not such an effort provide an unnecessarily truncated
system of rights? Many of the great liberals, including Mill and Rawls,

offer considerable support for deliberative democracy.2 But most of the

* Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of Political Science,
University of Chicago. I am grateful to Jon Elster and James Fleming for helpful comments on an
earlier draft.
1. See CASS R. SUNsTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 133-41 (1993).
2. See, e.g., JOHNSTUARTMILL, CONSIDERATIONSON REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT42 (Currin
V. Shields ed., 1958) (1861) (describing the ideal form of government as one in which every citizen
participates); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 5, 102 (Stefan
Collini ed., 1989) (1859) [hereinafter MILL, ON LIBERTY] (discussing the right of citizens to make
decisions by mutual agreement); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 5-6 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM] (reasoning that each citizen in a constitutional democracy is entitled to an
adequate scheme of rights in which political liberties are guaranteed their fair value); id. at 227
(discussing constitutional essentials); id. at 356-63 (arguing for fair value of political liberty); JOHN
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great liberals, emphatically including Mill and Rawls, point to a far
broader set of rights than those that follow from democracy alone.3
Invoking ideas of this sort, Professor Fleming's illuminating paper
argues that deliberative democracy is too partial and thin a source of
constitutional safeguards. 4 This guiding ideal fails to furnish the full set
of guarantees that emerge from a proper exercise in constitutional constructivism.5 In his view, the ideal stresses republican rights6 without sufficiently respecting liberal protections against government intrusions into
what is properly taken as the private sphere.7 Thus Professor Fleming
argues for constitutional protection of liberty of conscience, autonomy, and
freedom of association, even if these rights cannot be associated with
democracy itself.8 More particularly, Professor Fleming argues that the
rights to choose abortion and to engage in consensual sexual activity find
a secure home in autonomy principles even if democratic equality is not at
stake. 9
There is an obvious affinity between Rawlsian principles and those that
emerge from deliberative democracy.1" But Professor Fleming argues for

what he considers to be a more thoroughly Rawlsian approach to constitutional interpretation,"

an approach that would stress the interest in

RAWLS, A, THEORY OF JUSTICE 356-62 (1971) (contrasting deliberative democracy with market
conceptions of democracy).
3. See MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 15-16 (arguing that a free society cannot place
unwarranted limitations on the liberties of conscience, preference, and association); RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 5-6 (including nonpolitical rights among those protected by the two
principles of justice).
4. See James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEx. L. REV. 211,278
(1993).
5. I do not discuss here the question whether, at the level of constitutional method, it might be best
to adopt an alternative to constitutional constructivism. At the broadest level, all theories of interpretation-including, for example, those of Judge Bork and Justice Scalia-are exercises in construetivism, at least in the very general sense that they attempt to make sense rather than nonsense out of
the constitutional system. The real question is: Constructivism of what sort?
6. These rights are emphatically liberal too; they are crucial liberties of the moderns. See SAMUEL
H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 264-75 (1993) (describing a liberal commitment to governmentby discussion); MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 15 (noting
that the rights and interests of every person are secure from being disregarded only where every person
is able to assert them); RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supranote 2, at 5-6 (stating that political rights
are essential to political liberty).
7. Of course, the private sphere, including property rights, might well be seen as a precondition
for a well-functioning democracy. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 9-10
(1988) (noting, for example, the utilitarian argument that private ownership of property promotes
efficiency and social prosperity).
8. See Fleming, supra note 4, at 280.
9. See id. at 253-55.
10. Many non-Rawlsian theories push in the same general direction. See SUNSTEIN, supra note
1, at 141; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 247-49 (1993) (both
noting diverse sources of deliberative democracy).
11. There are considerable difficulties in "applying" Rawls's approach to constitutional interHeinOnline -- 72 Tex. L. Rev. 306 1993-1994
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autonomy even if that interest is not clearly connected with democratic
considerations.
In this space, I cannot discuss the many valuable points that Professor

Fleming raises. Instead I will identify one possible line of response to his
challenge to an approach that I have defended, a response that begins by

stressing the difference between a theory of a just society on the one hand
and a theory of constitutionalism or constitutional interpretation on the
other.12 I do not contend that the interests in freedom of conscience,
privacy, and autonomy13 do not belong in a good constitution, or that
these interests should not be recognized by reviewing courts.14 But it is
at least possible that the interest in deliberative democracy provides a good
account of constitutional interpretation even if it offers an inadequate theory
of justice, and that it is therefore worthwhile to stress that interest even if
we acknowledge that it does not exhaust the appropriate concerns of justice

or constitutionalism.
Begin by distinguishing among three sets of rights. The first consists

of those that are protected by a good society. The second consists of those
that are enumerated in a good constitution. The third consists of those that
are safeguarded by courts operating in the name of an existing constitution.
It should be clear that these three sets of rights need not be coexten-

sive.15 Under imaginable social circumstances, a good constitution might

pretation, as Professor Fleming is of course aware, and so I am not sure whether a Rawlsian form of
constitutional constructivism would diverge from one based on deliberative democracy.
12. I do not understand Professor Fleming to reject this distinction. I emphasize it here as
background for the discussion of the key issue of judicial interpretation of the Constitution.
13. Autonomy does not, however, require respect for all conceptions of the good, regardless of
the reasons offered on their behalf, or of their origins and consequences. For example, we might
safeguard autonomy of the perfectionist sort defended by Joseph Raz. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 381 (1986) (describing a form of autonomy that attends to the background
conditions under which conceptions of the good are formed). While avoiding perfectionism, Rawls has
emphasized background conditions in many places. See, e.g., John Rawls, The Basic Structure as
Subject, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 159 (1977). The debate between political and perfectionist forms of
liberalism raises many complexities that I cannot address here.
14. For two reasons, a commitment to deliberative democracy should further many of the interests
that concern Professor Fleming. First, that commitment calls for protection of some such interests,
prominently including liberty of conscience, which is a precondition for democracy. See SUNSTEIN,
supra note 1, at 142 (describing the repression of opposing views as antithetical to democracy).
Second, privacy and autonomy are often at risk because of an absence of political equality, and
therefore a kind of democratic failure is at work. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) are all examples. See
Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Foreword:Antidiscrimination and Constitutional
Accountability (What the Bork-BrennanDebate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 132-37 (1991) (advocating equality principles as a narrower alternative to substantive due process). But Professor
Fleming is right to say that democratic concerns do not capture all of what is at stake.
15. Rawls thus distinguishes between the "constitutional essentials" and other requirements of
justice, principally on grounds of urgency, ease of determining compliance, and ease of obtaining
general social agreement. See RAWLS, PoLITIcAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 227-30.
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omit certain rights that a just society ultimately would furnish.1" The
distinction might be justified on various grounds, including the difficulty
of obtaining agreement on the relevant rights at the constitutional stage17
and the likelihood that those rights will be adequately guaranteed through
ordinary political processes. In the United States, for example, it is
reasonable to think that freedom of contract or environmental protection are
important goods that should not be recognized in the Constitution. 8 In
Eastern Europe, we might believe that there is no special reason to constitutionalize the welfare state, even if its guarantees are properly part of a
decent society; perhaps there is no risk that the welfare state will be
jeopardized by the new regimes. One of a constitution's distinctive rolesespecially in the realm of rights-is to counteract predictable problems in
the ordinary politics of particular nations. For this reason a constitution
might not guarantee rights that, while a part of a good society, are not at
particular risk in the politics of the country for which the constitution is
designed. More generally, a constitution might be thought to be a mechanism for carrying out certain practical tasks, and if we focus on those
practical goals, we might end up with a document that does not by any
means track the best theory of justice.
So much for the possibility that the requirements of justice are not
coextensive with the requirements of a good constitution. There is also a
difference between what a good constitution requires and what courts ought
to be willing to mandate during the process of interpreting an existing
constitution. Two points are relevant here. First, courts charged with the
duty of interpretation should attend to constitutional text, structure, and
history, and these constraints on interpretation should produce substantial
differences between the meaning of the existing document and (what the
judges believe to be) a good constitutional provision on the subject at
hand.19 Second, it is important for judges to build into the interpretive
process a considerable degree of modesty stemming from their lack of
either fact-finding competence or a good electoral pedigree. It should not

16. I am putting to one side here the complex relations among justice, rights, and the quality of
life furnished in a good society.
17. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 227-30.
18. Nothing turns on whether the examples are well chosen. I put to one side the questions raised
by positing rights to collective goods.
19. There are complex issues lurking in the background here. No document is self-interpreting;
background principles are always at least implicitly at work. For different views, see 1 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 264 (1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court should integrate the people's
'expression of constitutional will" into the existing constitutional framework); RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE 360 (1986) ("Every conscientious judge. . . is an interprevist in the broadest sense:
each tries to impose the best interpretation on our constitutional structure and practice, to see these, all
things considered, in the best light they can bear."); SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 93-161 (describing the
principles underlying constitutional interpretation).
HeinOnline -- 72 Tex. L. Rev. 308 1993-1994
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be necessary to stress that judges are often unable to bring about significant
social reform on their own.' Because of the need for a high level of
judicial modesty, we might not be surprised to find significant traces of the
seemingly narrow political question doctrine throughout constitutional law
in general-as constitutional rights are judicially "underenforced," and
properly so, because of the courts' distinctive limitations.21
These points will lead to sharp differences between judicially enforceable rights on the one hand and, on the other, rights that are a part of a
just society or that belong in a good constitution. Even if, for example,
rights to subsistence and health care qualify as rights that a good society
would recognize, they might well be deemed absent from our Constitution
if judges use the ordinary sources of interpretation. And even if such
rights can be found through those sources-even if text, structure, and
history leave room to maneuver-judges might believe that these rights are
not properly subject to judicial enforcement. The courts may lack the tools
that are required for successful implementation; their efforts may be futile
or counterproductive. In any case, reasonable people might think that
judges should be especially cautious in these (and many other') areas.
It seems, then, that the category of judicially enforceable rights is a subset
of the category of genuine constitutional rights, and that the category of
genuine constitutional rights is in turn a subset of the category of rights
recognized in a just society.
Professor Fleming is convincing in his claim that rights without a
source in democratic deliberation nonetheless deserve to be protected in a
just society. He is also persuasive in saying that a just society concentrates
on rights of autonomy as well as rights of democratic equality.'
Nor
should it be denied that judges interpreting a good constitution, including
ours, might protect autonomy under (for example) the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment, the free exercise guarantee of the same
amendment, and (here much more controversially') the Due Process

20. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 336-43 (1992) (contending that courts can effect significant social reform only under special
conditions).
21. See Lawrence G. Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Unenforced ConstitutionalNorms,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1226 (1978) (arguing that a federal court's refusal to decide an issue because
of institutional propriety is not decisive of constitutional substance).
22. To take a recent example, consider the issue of whether homosexuals should be permitted to
serve in the military. I do not mean to resolve that issue here, but it is at least plausible to say that
courts should not invalidate a discriminatory plan in this complex context, but also to insist that any
such plan should be presumed or found unconstitutional by Congress and the President.
23. Some autonomy rights may be necessary, however, in significant part because of the absence
of equality. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), is a possible example. See supra note 14.
24. Part of the controversy stems from the obvious textual obstacle to substantive due process,
which is nonetheless well established; perhaps the same basic notion could have had a much happier
home in the adjacent clause protecting privileges and immunities. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of
HeinOnline -- 72 Tex. L. Rev. 309 1993-1994
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Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. There is thus real room
for judicial protection of autonomy rights of this kind, even if those rights
have little or nothing to do with democracy or deliberation. In these
circumstances it seems best to say that deliberative democracy is an important source of both constitutional rights and interpretive principles, but far
from exhaustive; the two words capture only a part of the picture.' On
this score I agree with Professor Fleming.
We might, however, want to make some distinctions here, distinctions
that are geared to the differences among just societies, just constitutions,
and a good role for reviewing courts. First, there is the distinction
between what justice requires and what belongs in a just constitution.
Undoubtedly a just constitution recognizes autonomy of various sorts; but
whether and how it does so depends on a range of highly contingent matters. Property rights, for example, seem important to personal autonomy,
but it is at least not clear that the Canadians have made a major mistake in
omitting such rights from their Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which has
The case for firm constitutional protection of
constitutional status.'
property rights-a case often made out in terms of autonomy-has far more
force in contemporary Russia than in Canada or the United States
I do
not mean to argue against giving constitutional recognition to rights of
autonomy, privacy, and conscience; but not all such rights belong in every
constitution. This is a matter that cannot be resolved on the basis of first
principles. We need to know a lot of details.
Now turn to the issue of judicial enforcement of the Constitution, the
central topic here. Building on Ely, I propose that judicial enforcement is
most readily defensible when democratic concerns come to the fore-not
because such concerns are merely procedural (they are not), and not because democratic rights are more important than anything else (they are
not), but because the principles that underlie appropriate judicial modesty
are weakest in that setting (which is not to say that they are decisive

Rights and the FourteenthAmendment, 101 YALE L.J 1193, 1220, 1264 (1992) (proposing a refined
model of incorporation of substantive guarantees into the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause). Part of the controversy stems also from nontextual concerns about judicial
definition of fundamental rights, concerns that seem to me legitimate for reasons suggested below.
25. Compare the discussion of capabilities and functionings in AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY
REEXAMINED 4-5, 39-55 (1992), with Martha Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in
LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 203, 225 (R. Bruce Douglass et al. eds., 1990). The items appearing in
these discussions are not limited to democratic considerations, and they could not plausibly all be
included in a constitution.
26. See CAN. CONsT. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 7
(excluding a general takings clause, but declaring that everyone has a right to, and the right to be free
from the deprivation of, life, liberty, and security of person).
27. See Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 CARDozo L. REv. 907, 922
(1993) (explaining the need for constitutionally protected property rights in countries like those in
Eastern Europe where culture and tradition threaten those rights).
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elsewhere).'
If courts do not protect the preconditions for democratic
government, the risks to liberty may be very grave. The predicate for
judicial caution evaporates when, for example, a group has been disenfranchised or when the right of political protest has been violated. It
follows that vigorous judicial protection of political speech is fully justified,
indeed more fully justified than judicial protection of many other rights.
To be sure, there is a good argument for judicial protection of free
speech on grounds not of democracy but of autonomy; that argument helps
explain the grant of constitutional protection to nonpolitical art and
literature.2 9 But for purposes of thinking about judicial review, there is
a real difference between censorship of art and censorship of criticism of
government, and the difference stems from the fact that ample protection
of political speech is a precondition for a well-functioning constitutional
democracy. When the state invades rights that follow from the commitment to deliberative democracy, there is reason to fear that political
processes will not be able to correct themselves.' And when there is no
problem from the democratic point of view, the relevant intrusions may
well be unjust but properly subject to remedy not via the judiciary, but
either through (a) public deliberation about constitutional goals or (b)
public deliberation unaffected by the Constitution at all. We might reach
this conclusion because the Constitution simply does not speak to the
intrusions or because the founding document speaks, or should be taken to
speak, to the elected branches rather than to courts.
It is important in this connection to note that the category of fundamental rights is highly contested in our society; consider debates over such
diverse things as property rights, contractual rights, welfare rights, and
rights of sexual choice. Judges are themselves in sharp disagreement on
these matters. Even if we think that Professor Fleming's version of constitutional constructivism has it about right, we might believe that the judicial
definition of fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause-a definition
operating without much textual or historical help-ought to be very cautious, in part because of the difficulty of obtaining broad social agreement
on these questions. When we are dealing with judicial protection of nondemocratic rights, the risks of error-its likelihood and cost-are very
high, and the potential benefits are highly speculative. When courts are
protecting democratic deliberation-an ideal built deeply into American
constitutionalism and unusually susceptible to both definition and development-the benefits are likely to be great, and the risks are far lower.
28. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusT 87-104 (1980).
29. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 137-48. Much more must, of course, be said on the
constitutionally central issue of religion. This is a significant gap in The Partial Constitution. See
SUNSTEIN, supra note 1.
30. For the classic statement of this view, see ELY, supra note 28, at 103.
HeinOnline -- 72 Tex. L. Rev. 311 1993-1994
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This judgment cannot be defended by an algorithm, but I think that it
is an important lesson of our history, as well as of an inquiry into the
institutional characteristics of judges and legislatures. Some platitudes are
worth repeating: So long as democratic goals" are met, judges should allow majorities to make (what judges consider to be) some mistakes, even
if those mistakes involve (what judges consider to be) injustice. The realm
of what is judicially enforced as unconstitutional is not coextensive with the
realm of the unjust as judicially conceived, even though some judges may
be able to offer especially persuasive accounts.
In light of widespread social disagreements over what justice requires,
then, the Constitution should allow considerable scope for experimentation
and debate (subject to the significant constraints of deliberative democracy).
The same is even more emphatically true of a theory of constitutional interpretation, because the appropriate theory ought to insist on constraining the
judges, and because in the absence of judicial agreement on the requirements of justice, courts ought to focus principally on violations of democratic commitments" and also on what is realistically redressable by
judges. For this reason, it is unclear that the interest in privacy or
autonomy, standing by itself, provides an adequate defense of Roe v.
Wade33 or an adequate attack on Bowers v. Hardwick.4 I cannot discuss
these complex cases here; no general theory can substitute for concrete
engagement with particular problems and particular provisions. But at least
it seems less adventurous to rely on equal protection principles, because
those principles provide a narrower and, I think, more secure basis for
decision.
Let me conclude with a brief summary. A theory of constitutional interpretation35 that amounted to a full-blown theory of just outcomes would
offer inadequate room for democratic rule, at least if that theory did not
allow judges to permit participants in democracy to make some errors, including errors from the standpoint of justice.36 To state it more precisely:

31. Of course these are contested too. I am arguing that it is appropriate for courts to take the
Constitution as sharply delimiting the ingredients of democratic deliberation, while also allowing the
political process a measure of discretion in defining fundamental interests.
32. See Confirmation of Ruth Bader Ginsburg as Supreme Court Justice: Hearings Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (July 21, 1993), available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
Fednew File (statement of Judge Ginsburg) ("[Wihen political avenues become dead-end streets, judicial
intervention in the politics of the people may be essential in order to have effective politics.").
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Here I am not responding to Professor Fleming, who argues for
invocation of both liberty and equality, rather than reliance on either standing alone. See Fleming,
supra note 4, at 253-55.
35. l am speaking here of interpretation within thejudiciary; there is less need for constraint when
interpretation is occurring elsewhere. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 140 (discussing the meaning of
constitutional obligations "outside the courtroom").
36. On this view, Ronald Dworkin's influential and powerful conception of constitutional
interpretation is not sufficiently democratic, and it does not sufficiently engage the many risks raised
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Democracy is itself a requirement of justice, and in any case there are large
difficulties in adapting any theory of justice for use in constitutional
interpretation, where we are dealing with at best a second-best world, one
that requires constraints on judicial discretion. The appropriate theory of
justice, adapted for such a world, may well call for a theory of constitutional interpretation based principally-if not exclusively-on deliberative
democracy, 37 because that theory allows the requisite space for democratic
rule, that is, the space implied by the appropriate theory of justice.
To say this is not to deny that a good constitution, including ours,
ought to the extent fairly possible35 to be interpreted so as to help
counteract the most conspicuous and serious failures of justice, even if
those failures cannot be connected with democratic goals. But I hope that
I have said enough to show why there is a significant space between a
theory of justice and a theory of constitutional interpretation. I think that
because of this space, courts should defer to legislative judgments involving
some intrusions on privacy and autonomy.

by judicial discretion. See, for example, Dworkin's well-known essay, Liberalism, with its three-level
theory: Markets are seen as reflecting an appropriate neutrality among competing conceptions of the
good, and as having considerable normative force, except that they need correction for market failures
of various sorts; democracy offers that correction; but democracy allows for external preferences, and
so constitutionalism is a check on it. See RONALD DWORKIN, Liberalism, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
181 (1985). I cannot discuss here the many questions raised by this view, but it may be apparent that
it allows very little space for democracy between the larger defining ideals of markets and
constitutionalism. See also the discussion of Dworkin in SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 344-45.
37. I think that this suggestionis in thegeneral spirit of Rawls's own approach, which allows some
aspects of the preferred theory ofjustice to be excluded from the constitutional essentials. See RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 227-30 (proposing that some requirements of justice are not
constitutional essentials).
38. I refer here to the constraints of text, history, and structure.
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